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Abstract:
In this paper we discuss a particular marriage model, i.e., a model for the number of marriages for
each age combination as a function of the vectors of the number of single men and women in each
age group. The model is based on Dagsvik (1998) where it is demonstrated that a specific matching
game played at the individual level imply, under specific assumptions about the distribution of the
preferences, a convenient expression for the corresponding structural marriage model.
Data from the Norwegian Population Register for nine years are applied to estimate the model. We
subsequently test the hypothesis that, apart from a random “noise” component, the age-specific
parameters change over time according to a common trend. We find that the hypothesis is not
rejected by our data.
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31. Introduction
The classical stable population models rests on a one-sex theory represented by age-specific fertility
and death rates for the female population. It is, however, recognized that when there are substantial
differences between the female and the male population, the one-sex models may lead to quite
unrealistic predictions, see for example Pollak (1990), and Kuczynski (1932, pp. 36-38). Kuczynski
pointed out that since more than 50 per cent of the newborns are boys, predictions based on the male
population may imply an increasing population while the opposite may be the case for one-sex models
based on the female population.
The two-sex problem was already discussed by Lotka (1922). Several researchers have
proposed different types of theories based on two-sex marriage models, that is, models that yield the
number of marriages of each possible age combination as a function of the number of unmarried
females and males, in each age group. These contributions include Fredrickson (1971), Keyfitz
(1971), Feeney (1972), McFarland (1972), Das Gupta (1973), Pollard (1977) and Shoen (1977, 1981).
Although these authors have made seminal contributions to the literature on two-sex
marriage models, the proposed models are nonetheless unsatisfactory from a behavioral point of view.
Explicitly stated, these models are not derived from a theory of individual behavior. Without such a
theory, it is difficult to give a precise interpretation of key concepts and parameters in the marriage
model. In other words, the models are ad hoc from a theoretical perspective.
The analysis in this paper is based on a two-sex marriage model that is derived from a theory
of two-sided matching. The point of departure is the game-theoretic analysis of marriage markets
summarized in Roth and Sotomayor (1990). The literature on matching behavior does not, however,
consider the aggregation problem of predicting the number of matches of each type as a function of
the number of agents of each type and parameters that represent the corresponding distribution of
preferences. This aggregation problem was analyzed by Dagsvik (1998) who derived a particular
aggregate matching model from assumptions about the distribution of preferences of the agents in the
market and assumptions about the rules of the matching game. The model proposed by Dagsvik
(1998) offers therefore the possibility of establishing a behavioral two-sex marriage model.
While the discussion in Dagsvik (1998) was intended to apply to different types of matching
markets, the focus in this paper is on empirical modelling and estimation of a two-sex marriage model
based on Dagsvik's framework. The empirical analysis is based on population register data from
Statistics Norway for the years 1985 to 1994.
4The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we outline the theoretical point of departure
and the structure of the (aggregate) marriage model. In Section 3 qualitative properties of the model
are addressed, and in Section 4 a particular extension of the model is discussed. Section 5 describes
the data, and in the last section we report the empirical results.
2. A behavioral two-sex model
In this section we outline the key elements of a behavioral theory for the marriage market and the
implied two-sex model. For a more detailed analysis including proofs we refer to Dagsvik (1998).
As mentioned above, our theory is based on a particular two-sided matching game which has
been extensively analyzed by numerous authors, and discussed in Roth and Sotomayor (1990). We
shall now describe a particular matching algorithm called the “deferred acceptance” algorithm, which
intends to give a rough approximation to the actual real life marriage game.
Consider a population of men and women who are looking for a partner to form a match
(marriage). Each man and each woman are supposed to have sufficient information about the
population of the opposite sex so as to be able to establish preference lists, i.e., lists of rankings of all
potential partners, including the alternative of being single. The matching process towards equilibrium
takes place in several stages. There are no search costs and the agents have no information about the
preferences of potential partners, which means that they are ignorant about their “chances” in the
market. The deferred acceptance algorithm goes as follows: Either the women or the men make offers,
that is, if the men make the offers no woman is allowed to make offers.
Let us first introduce some basic terminology that concerns the rules of the game in the first
setting referred to in the introduction above. The following concepts are borrowed from Roth and
Sotomayor (1990).
A man is acceptable to a woman if the woman prefers to be married (matched) to the man
rather than staying single. Consider a matching denoted by m that matches a pair (m,f) who are not
mutually acceptable. Then at least one of the agents would prefer to be single rather than being
matched to the other. Such a matching m is said to be blocked by the unhappy agent. Consider next a
matching m such that there exist a man m and a woman f who are matched to one another, but who
prefer each other to their assignment at m (given the rules of the game). The pair (m,f) is said to block
the matching m . We say that a matching m is stable if it is not blocked by any individual or pair of
agents.
Gale and Shapley (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990)) have demonstrated that stable matchings
exist for every matching market. Specifically they prove that the “deferred acceptance” procedure
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indifference is ruled out. The algorithm goes as follows: Suppose the men make the offers. First each
man makes an offer to his favorite woman. Each woman rejects the offer from any man who is
unacceptable to her, and each woman who receives more than one offer from any man rejects all but
her most preferred among these. Any man whose offer is not rejected at this point is kept temporarily
“engaged” until better offers arrive. At any step any man who was rejected at the previous step makes
an offer to his next choice i.e., to his most preferred woman among those who have not rejected him.
Each woman receiving offers rejects any from unacceptable men, and also rejects all but her most
preferred among the group of the new offers and any man she may have kept engaged from the
previous step. The algorithm stops after any step in which no man is rejected. (The final stage.) The
matches are now consummated with each man being married to the woman he is engaged.
The stability argument goes as follows: Suppose that man m and woman f are not matched
to each other, but m prefers f to his partner. Then woman f must be acceptable to man m, and so he
must have made an offer to f before making an offer to his current partner. Since m was not engaged
to f when the algorithm stopped, m must have been rejected by f in favor of someone she (f) liked
more. Therefore, f is matched to a man whom f likes more than man m, and so m and f do not block
the matching. Since the matching is not blocked by any individual or any pair, it is stable. Similarly
one could apply a rule where the women make offers to the men. However, this would not necessarily
produce a matching that is equal to the former one.
Next we shall introduce some concepts and notations which will enable us to describe
formally the marriage model. We assume that the preferences of the individuals are represented by
latent utility indexes. Let Fi be the number of single women in age group i and Mj the number of
single men in age group j, i S= 1 2, ,... , , j D= 1 2, ,... , . Let U ijfm be the utility of female f in age group i
of being married to man m in age group j, and let Uif0 be the utility of female f in age group i of being
single. Let Vji
mf be the utility of man m in age group j of being married to female f in age group i, and
let Vj
m
0 be the corresponding utility of being single. We assume that the utilities have the following
structure
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